This December, Iran test-fired an upgraded version of its most advanced missile, capable of carrying nuclear material and hitting Israel as well as parts of Europe. The New York Times reported that American and European intelligence agencies have been collaborating on analysis of an Iranian document that suggest Iran is working on plans for experiments that would perfect the ability to deliver an atom bomb. Just three days ago, Iran brazenly announced it is now enriching uranium at 20% levels, far above what is needed for a nuclear power plant.
Like the final scene of the Godfather, Iraqi leaders opposed to Iranian influence were systematically killed off by anonymous assassins at the end of December, the same time Iran contemptuously marched troops onto previously Iraqi controlled oil wells in disputed border territory. Simultaneously, on the condition of anonymity, an AIEA member nation released a report to the AP about how Iran recently tried to smuggle 1,350 tons of purified uranium ore from Kazakhstan.
Many are quick to point out that we cannot know what would happen if Iran got the nuke. A nuclear bomb may still never go off. They are right, we cannot know what would happen, but we know what could happen. The odds of a nuclear war may not be as large as many lead us to believe. But even if the odds are not likely, when considering the gravity of the consequences – the risk is huge.
The world is more heavily integrated than any point in human history. Our economies are all entangled and stored electronically; we live in a digital world economy sustained simply on the faith of its own stability. Our environment is suffering from our waste and pollution, but such damage would not compare to nuclear explosions.
Previously in human history, a massive war could bring down a region, but trade and assimilation with neighboring nations would eventually revive the region to health. With the increase in the level of destruction that an individual with access to nuclear material can do, combined with the increased levels of globalization, a nuclear bomb anywhere in the world would certainly change life as we know it – and not for the better.
Additionally, those that argue that Iran would never let a nuclear bomb leak out, nevertheless use one themselves, are following the same fallacious premises that are the foundation of modern economics, and also the main reason we’re in the financial circumstance we’re in. Modern economic theory only works under the assumption that 1) People have perfect access to information 2) People will act exclusively out of self-interest and 3) People will make rational decisions.
This same faulty logic is being applied by political strategists, even though the Iran does not quite fit the bill. Iran’s leaders are certainly thinking out of self-interest, but interest for themselves as individuals, not for Iran as a nation. Additionally, considering the levels of religious extremism and the absence of true democracy and free media, it cannot be said that Iranians have perfect access to information or will make rational decisions. The thought processes of their leadership is significantly different than that of our leaders, and we need to take that into account when trying to measure risks.
Iran has proven that it will only admit to details on its nuclear program when caught and has no intention of stopping its nuclear program if the nation’s leaders have a choice. At this point, it might be a circumstance of “too little, too late”, but if it is possible to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, the nation’s leaders must be made to feel that they do not have a choice.
The nation’s leaders have simply continued a pattern of feigned cooperation to buy enough time from the West to reach the point of no return, where the West can no longer prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
The question then becomes, how much time do we have? Not much, according to an IAEA report that Mr. Baradei attempted to block but was leaked to the New York Times. The report suggests that Iran has developed the technology to weaponize nuclear material and has worked on the military technology capable of delivering a nuclear weapon.
This leak, combined with the recent seizure of a massive shipment of arms from Iran to Hezbollah, suggests that the possibility of Israel taking military action is becoming more likely. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said that the weapons seizure proved “unequivocally and without a doubt” the existence of the Iran-Syria-Lebanon weapons-trafficking route.
After the P5 + 1 talks (the five permanent security council members and Germany), Iran agreed to allow inspectors into the discovered secret nuclear facility at Qom. However, this concession was not one of goodwill; it came only after the inability to deny the West’s knowledge of the existence of the plant and under threats of harsh international sanctions.
They agreed to investigation by Mohamed El Baradei (the head of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency who has been accused of intentionally withholding information that incriminated Iran). Iran also agreed to exporting a significant portion of their low grade uranium to be enriched outside of Iran and returned under supervision as high-grade uranium for use as fuel rods for Iran’s medical research reactor.
But Iran then missed a deadline on accepting the details of the uranium export agreement, and then ultimately declined the agreement altogether. Iran has also delayed investigation into the Qom plant by more than enough time than what would be required to clean up any incriminating evidence. The concessions Iran has made do not reveal a reversal in policy direction or an abandonment of a nuclear weapons program.
This should not be a surprise. The Natanz plant that Iran likewise hid until the West discovered it now carries 8,000 centrifuge enrichment machines, enriching uranium far beyond the levels required for a power plant. The Iranian perspective on commitments and claims to the West could perhaps be best exemplified by recent comments from the Iranian speaker of parliament and former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, who claimed that staying in or out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty they have already signed really “makes no difference.” What they have told the West was simply political maneuvering and Iran never has had any intention of taking any of their commitments or claims in negotiations seriously.
Many international leaders are beginning to acknowledge the inability to negotiate with Iranian leaders. As British PM Gordon Brown outlined at the G20 summit this September, we need to acknowledge “the level of deception by the Iranian government, and the scale of what we believe is the breach of international commitments…. Confronted by the serial deception of many years, the international community has no choice today, but to draw a line in the sand.”
Brown claimed that sanctions would be necessary if no results were achieved during October negotiations, but under American leadership, the negotiations have simply continued to be prolonged. We have been trying to cooperate with Iran for many years, and just recently they have brazenly tested missiles that serve no defensive capability and have been caught attempting to smuggle uranium ore. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Fool me twenty-eight times, and I’m just being willfully blind. The US needs to acknowledge what most of the world already understands – a diplomatic approach with Iran will not work on its own.
That’s not to say the negotiations have been entirely fruitless. They have pressured Russia and China, the two most significant roadblocks to meaningful sanctions against Iran, to acknowledge that further steps may need to be taken. The two nations are unlikely to take those steps themselves, but they now have no justification for standing in the way of the West when we do take those steps. Additionally, Russia seems extremely unlikely to sell the anti-aircraft weaponry it had been considering selling to Iran.
Russia and China probably always knew that negotiations would not bear any fruit from Iran. The current regime simply has an incredibly untrustworthy track record. But confrontation with Iran didn’t seem to be in the self-interest of either nation. Russia benefits politically from the West’s entanglement in the Middle East (i.e. Russia faced minimal backlash for its invasion of Ukraine) and also benefits economically from its trade network and conventional weapons sales to Iran. Similarly, China has over $100 billion in investment contracts in Iran, who also happens to be one of China’s main suppliers of oil. Neither Russia nor China take serious concern that Iran would ever turn their nukes on them.
However, with a more conciliatory American President attempting diplomatic negotiations whose failure clearly lies with the Iranians, Russia and China’s interests in the country are becoming harder to defend.
Additionally, both countries are likely beginning to consider whether non-confrontation really is in their best interest after all. Whether the result is a nuclear war in Iran or the country simply becoming a hegemonic bully, the consequences of Iran obtaining a nuke would be severely economically and politically destabilizing, and no longer seems to outweigh the particular financial interests Russia and China have in Iran.
In a recent diplomatic mission to China, Senior National Security Council officials Dennis Ross and Jeffrey Bader described the consequences of the potential of an Israeli strike and of the Gulf nations (and eventually Asian nations) attempting to acquire nukes after witnessing Iran’s success, and feeling threatened by it. These countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have been proposed as solutions to weaning China off of Iranian oil. China certainly has taken notice that many Arab Middle Eastern states seem more concerned about Iran’s potential nuclear program than they are about the longstanding Israeli nuclear arsenal, and they have publicly chastised Iran since the American diplomatic mission.
Neither China nor Russia will be open to confronting Iran directly themselves, but as one senior Russian diplomat recently explained, “we will not stand aside” if others agree on sanctions. In December, both Russia and China supported a US drafted resolution condemning Iran for its recent behavior. This may not seem like much, but for two countries that were previously the largest barriers to punishing Iran to now publicly castigate the nation is considerable progress. If used wisely, this provides the West more leverage and opens up many opportunities to approach Iran that neither China nor Russia will lead the charge for, but will most likely not actively prevent any more.
So we have attained what cooperation we can from Russia and China, and the whole world seems to acknowledge that Iran cannot be trusted, so why has the US leadership continued to extend negotiations? Between the internal unrest in Iran, growing international consensus and anger in regards to Iran’s nuclear program, and the developing border dispute crisis between Iran and Iraq, it is possible that Ahmadinejad may finally be reaching a point where he sees suspending the nuclear weapons program in his best interest, or at least where obtaining nukes is no longer the highest priority.
Even still, it is unlikely that he won’t try to deceive the West into thinking he is stopping before he actually does. I’m not saying that we should halt negotiations altogether, I’m simply suggesting we should not rely on only one approach to stop a potentially enormous catastrophe, especially if that one approach is diplomatic negotiations alone.
While we have used the potential of an Israeli strike to frighten the Chinese into action, we need to consider the time-sensitive implications of such an event ourselves. Even if Iran were never to use a nuclear bomb, the ability to do so would create such a brain drain of Isreali elite fleeing the country, that the nation would likely face economic collapse amidst very hostile neighbors. We should not expect Israel to stand quietly by while Iran’s leader openly calls for its destruction, actively sends weapons to terrorist organizations that use those weapons against Israeli citizens, has the ability to weaponize nuclear material and is actively working to create nuclear material in facilities they try to keep secret.
America might be tempted to let Israel handle its dirty work, but it seems that a military strike on its own may not put a complete stop to Iran’s nuclear weaponization. While it may extend the timeline the West has to prevent Iran’s attainment of a nuclear weapon, a military strike would at best set the program back a few years. And with Iran’s increasing defensive capabilities and its distance from Israel, many strategists doubt Israel’s ability to carry out an effective surprise attack at all.
The West must do everything in its power to push Iranian leaders into abandoning their nuclear ambitions. One strategy alone is not likely to succeed, but a multi-dimensional approach that includes support of Iranian domestic opposition, economically debilitating trade sanctions, increased cooperation from Russia and China, and the serious threat of actual military action will be far more likely to succeed then the current passive approach the American administration is taking.
One of the many strategies that should be implemented is harsher sanctions. Russia, pleased by the abandonment of the US anti-missile shield and angered by the Qom revelation, is unlikely to veto new Security Council sanctions, and China is unlikely to hold out on its own. In fact, both Security Council countries that had been the major opponents to UN sanctions have publicly admonished Tehran more consistently over the past few months.
This week, Ahmadinejad proudly revealed the Iranian ability to enhance uranium to nearly 20%, more than five times the concentration we had previously believed they had reached. In reaction, the US, Britain and France all called for tougher sanctions as soon as possible, but that’s beginning to seem like the boy who cried wolf. Without significant pressure from the American leadership, such sanctions will never get passed.
Additionally, while traditional UN sanctions would prove extremely helpful to put significant economic pressure on Iran, other creative forms of economic punishment could be taken as well.
For example, the US has restricted banks from funneling Iranian money through the American banking system, but many banks have continued to do so. Last January, the US levied the largest penalty ever to a bank for secretly channeling Sudanese and Iranian money through the American financial system. Lloyds TSB has been forced to forfeit $350 million, providing strong disincentives to other financial organizations to assist Iran with such financial activity.
Over the past few months, many other major financial powers have criticized Iran and called for preventative action, including Great Britain where Lloyds still holds Iranian money. America should encourage these countries to enforce similar economic sanctions and advise them on how to implement the intricate details of such sanctions.
After a recent research study, the California Department of Insurance discovered that about 340 insurance companies licensed to do business in California had about $6 billion invested indirectly in business involving Iran’s nuclear, defense and energy industries. As a result, the state passed a law that will take effect April 1st, preventing insurance companies to consider any investments that even indirectly touch Iran as counting towards their surpluses or reserves, making the investments far riskier. Such measures should be passed in other States and in other sectors, as well as encouraged abroad.
We should continue to push for UN cooperation, but we should not wait for it. House Resolution 2194 (The Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act) has passed the House but not yet the Senate. This would expand American sanctions against Iran by forcing petroleum companies to choose whether to do business with Iran or the US. Despite their massive oil reserves, Iran still imports their petroleum as they do not have the complicated petroleum refinement technology they need. Luckily, neither Russia nor China have mastered that technology yet either. While some smaller companies will clearly choose to work with a less competitive market in Iran, the biggest companies will most likely choose to work with the larger and more powerful market in the US.The approach of forcing businesses to choose between the American market and the Iranian market is a powerful one and could prove incredibly debilitating to an already economically faltering Iranian government.
The prospect of facing economic collapse may force the Iranian leadership to rethink their priorities. Time is running out, and other countries should be encouraged to pass similar sanctions. America should also consider passing such sanctions in other industries outside of the petroleum industry.
The carrot of dropped sanctions must be made tangible and meaningful to Iran, but should be buttressed by something stronger that the Iranian leaders can point to as progress rather than the resolution of a problem they created. One such option would be the provision of an oil pipeline to Central Europe, whose profits would prove far larger than an Iranian nuclear program, and whose existence would also significantly counter Russia’s growing dominance in the region.
But a carrot without a stick is worthless. Financial incentives need to be paired with the credible threat of actual military action. The West has threatened a military strike, with French President Nicholas Sarkozy going so far as to explain that two options exist: An Iranian nuclear bomb or the bombing of Iran. But with the US entangled in Afghanistan and Iraq (where Iran continuously funds domestic conflict and destabilizes peace efforts), Iran does not take these threats seriously. While Iran practices war games in the Strait of Hormuz, America simply states that there is a military option, without giving Iran much cause to fear such an option would ever be enacted to prevent its nuclear weaponization.
A bipartisan American report suggests that the US begin overtly planning for a military strike. As former Air Force General Charles Wald (who helped draft the report) explains, the Iranians “frankly don’t believe that we would do anything against them.” This drains us of all of our leverage. We may be too overextended to handle a third conflict right now, but behaving as such only emboldens Iran.
Additionally, there are more military options than full-scale war. An air strike against the Isfahan, Arak and Natanz nuclear reactors would set back Iran significantly, perhaps for enough time to reconsider its priorities as its economic and political circumstances continue to change.
Another strategy should be to capitalize on the public dissension and the fear that has caused the Iranian leadership to refocus on their own political survival. During recent riots, the Iranian President and the Clerics were likely panicked at the prospect of losing power over the people, knowing full well the instability of totalitarian rule when civilian dissatisfaction becomes widespread and public. The harsh Iranian crackdown on domestic opposition should be interpreted as a sign of weakness and desperation, not as one of strength and power.
While a military strike may only delay Iran’s nuclear weaponization by a couple years, a military strike may become necessary if Iran gets to the point where we need to buy that time. However, a military strike would likely prove to be a setback in terms of Iran’s domestic dissent.
The Iranian regime recovered from deep internal tensions and public dissatisfaction with its governance when Saddam Hussein attacked in 1980. Historically, even the most unstable and repressive regimes experience a massive outpouring of domestic support when attacked by a foreign nation, such as when Germany attacked Russia at the height of Stalin’s repression.
After Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent reelection this summer, the Iranian population has been more vocal about their dissent. Iran has responded with beatings and other methods of coercion and fear, certainly affecting the number of unsatisfied Iranians willing to risk public protest, but the protests have continued and the dissension among the population is evident and destabilizing for the Iranian leadership. One recent protest saw Iranians calling on Obama to side with them over Ahmadinejad.
While the willingness to publicly profess dissension decreases with each brutal government reaction, the actual dissatisfaction of the Iranian population with their own government does not decrease, and if anything seems to continue to grow.
Riots exploded again in Tehran in late December, with anywhere from eight to fifteen people killed and hundreds arrested. The murdered included Ali Mousavi, the nephew of the Hossein Mousavi, the main opposition leader in Iran. Tens of thousands of pro-reform protestors turned into rioters as they clashed with Iranian security forces, throwing stones at police and setting cars on fire. Although the protests were originally directed at Ahmadenijad after his fraudulent election in June, they have begun to seem more directed at the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khameni, a significant shift. 
The opposition hopes to increase the divide between Ahmadenijad and the regime’s second most powerful cleric, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. If they continue to succeed in spreading the public protests, they hope to pressure Khameni into forcing Ahmadenijad to compromise with the more moderate Rafsanjani. Unfortunately, this time, Iranian security forces moved swiftly to repress the riots, brutally attacking protestors on the streets, shutting down subway stations, and arresting family and top aides of opposition leaders Mousavi and Khatami. In January, the conservative Iranian Judiciary sentenced two protestors two death by hanging for political crimes.
Just yesterday, protests erupted yet again, and we should expect more harsh crack-downs by the government and violent clashes between protestors and security forces. As opposed to the December protest, the main opposition leaders are openly backing these protests, convinced that they must capitalize on the growing momentum.
We cannot allow the Iranians opposed to the current regime to lose hope. The domestic opposition has been far more open and apparent than the opposition discussed regarding the local Iraqis prior to the American invasion of Iraq. The Iranian public is far more literate, educated and vocal, often displaying signs in English as if to show the world the importance and determination of their message.
The West needs to capitalize on this dissatisfaction. We probably have no real idea what our government is doing to support internal dissent; blatant and direct assistance may only weaken the domestic support for the Iranian opposition, so our leaders will be more likely to provide such support quietly. But that does not mean that as American citizens we should avoid publicly encouraging our political leaders to pursue a multi-pronged approach that includes supporting internal dissension in Iran, which proves destabilizing for its current government.
The Iranian government sees foreign involvement in domestic affairs as a major threat, as illustrated when the semi-official pro-government Fars News Agency reported that protestors took to the streets in recent riots when they “followed the call of foreign media.” History has shown that dictators have often been overthrown by domestic opponents when gaining significant support of foreign patrons, such as with Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, the Polish Communists, or the South African Apartheid. The Iranian leadership knows this, and judging by the show trials in Iran where the defendants have “admitted” involvement in an American plot to overthrow the government, the leadership seems frankly paranoid about this threat.
The Iranian leaders do not display this same sort of paranoia in regards to their nuclear program. They seem considerably more fearful of defeat by domestic opponents empowered by America than by America’s actual willingness to attack Iran directly to prevent its nuclearization. While their focus has been accurately directed at their real weakness, our focus has not been.
Iran’s primary goal in the past few months has been to reestablish stability and control. Our primary goal with Iran has been to prevent its nuclear weaponization, but it should have been to maintain and assist the internal threats to the government’s stability, and in turn prevent the nation’s nuclear weaponization.
Between the failures and the successes of our government’s clandestine support for domestic opposition in the former Soviet Union, we should know how to implement effective rebellion support tactics. Whereas some diplomats were concerned that sanctions would rally the Iranian people behind their government, sanctions may provide the domestic opposition another opportunity to prove the current regime’s failure while simultaneously weakening the already politically and economically unstable Iranian government.
It may not require a massive revolution to prevent Iran from going nuclear, but the serious loss of domestic stability and control and a movement even heading in the direction of a revolution may be enough for the government to change its priorities and focus on the immediate need of political survival. Such refocusing would require diverting resources from its nuclear program and minimizing foreign involvement.
Again, that isn’t to say that sanctions and support for domestic opposition will prevent Iran from attaining a nuke, but in combination with serious consideration and threat of a military option and increased involvement with Iran’s more traditional supporters and trade partners, the odds of Iran continuing their current trajectory towards nuclear militarization are far lower than continuing with negotiations alone.
Sources:
Al Jazeera – Reformist Held After Iran Riots: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/06/200961445310869719.html
Atlantic-Community.Org – Iran’s Fabricated Elections: http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Iran%27s_Fabricated_Elections:_The_US_and_EU_Must_React
BBC News – Brown on Iran’s Serial Deception: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8275101.stm
CNN World – Iran Opposition Leader’s Nephew Buried After Riots: http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/12/30/iran.moussavi.burial/
The Economist – Nuclear Proliferation: An Iranian Nuclear Bomb or the Bombing of Iran: http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=15016192
The Economist – Iran Misses Yet Another Deadline: http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14732577
The Economist – Israel is Not Alone in Confronting Iran:
http://www.economist.com/theworldin/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14742438
The Economis – Iran: Fearless or Foolhardy:
Govtrak – Iran Refined Petroleum Act: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2194
The Guardian – Lloyds forfeits $350m for disguising origins of funds from Iran and Sudan:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jan/10/lloyds-forfeits-350m-to-us
MSNBC – Report: Iran Seeking to Smuggle Raw Uranium: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34622227/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/
Newsweek – Zakaria: Containing a Nuclear Iran – http://www.newsweek.com/id/216702/page/1
Meacham – The Chance of Nuclear Armageddon – http://www.newsweek.com/id/216701
Israeli Ambassador Reiterates Stance about “All Options” – http://www.newsweek.com/id/216718
Israel seizes massive weapons cache sent from Iran to Hezbollah -http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1256799097285
Iranian Protests – http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091104/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_iran
New York Post – Iran Riots Deadly: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/international/iran_riots_deadly_4N1IbFP6d3WIO10wuaH56I
The New York Times – U.S. and Allies Warn Over Nuclear ‘Deception’:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/world/middleeast/26nuke.html
San Luis Obispo Tribune – California Seeks Full Divestment of Insurers from Iran: http://www.sanluisobispo.com/financial/story/1022488.html
The Scoop – Foreign Policy Initiative Roundup: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0912/S00494.htm
Stratfor – Iran: The Regime Considers the Path Ahead: http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/151317/analysis/20091228_iran_regime_considers_path_ahead
Stratfor – Iran: Clashes in Tehran and an Ominous Outlook: http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/151255/analysis/20091227_iran_clashes_tehran_and_ominous_outlook
Stratfor – Watching Iran for a Breaking Point: http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/151155/analysis/20091223_intelligence_guidance_special_edition_watching_iran_breakpoint
Stratfor: Russia, Iran and The Biden Speech – http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091026_russia_iran_and_biden_speech?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=091026&utm_content=readmore
The Sun – 8 Dead in Iran Riot: http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/2785699/Five-dead-as-Iran-riots-against-government.html
Times Online – Iran starts processing nuclear fuel towards weapons-grade strength:
Times Online – Nuclear Cheating: The West must press home its advantage after catching Iran red-handed – http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article6861005.ece
The Washington Post – The US Should Target Iran’s Instability: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/29/AR2009092902931.html
The Washington Post – China’s Backing on Iran Followed Dire Predictions: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/25/AR2009112504112.html?hpid=topnews


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